# CAUSE NO. 2020-52383

THE STATE OF TEXAS,	§	
Plaintiff,	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
	§	
vs.	§	HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
	§	
CHRIS HOLLINS, in his official	§	
Capacity as Harris County Clerk,	§	
Defendant.	§	127 <sup>th</sup> JUDICIAL DISTRICT

## **ORDER ON TEMPORARY INJUNCTION APPLICATION**

## Background

On August 25, 2020, the Harris County Clerk, Chris Hollins, tweeted the following:



Harris County Clerk 🤣 @HarrisVotes · Aug 25 Update: our office will be mailing every registered voter an application to vote by mail. To learn more about voting by mail in Harris County, Please visit HarrisVotes.com/votebymail.

Two days later, Keith Ingram, the Elections Director for the Secretary of State, sent a letter

to Mr. Hollins asking him to "immediately halt any plan to send an application for ballot

by mail to all registered voters."

Ingram and Hollins spoke by phone on August 31 and discussed Hollins's plan and Ingram's objections. The State of Texas filed its Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction on that same day. The Parties agreed to litigate the issues at a temporary injunction hearing on September 9.

The State seeks to restrain Hollins pursuant to section 31.005 of the Texas Election Code, which states:

Sec. 31.005. PROTECTION OF VOTING RIGHTS.

(a) The secretary of state may take appropriate action to protect the voting rights of the citizens of this state from abuse by the authorities administering the state's electoral processes.

(b) If the secretary determines that a person performing official functions in the administration of any part of the electoral processes is exercising the powers vested in that person in a manner that impedes the free exercise of a citizen's voting rights, the secretary may order the person to correct the offending conduct. If the person fails to comply, the secretary may seek enforcement of the order by a temporary restraining order or a writ of injunction or mandamus obtained through the attorney general.

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 31.005.

The State also contends that Hollins is acting *ultra vires* under the State's interpretation of Election Code section 84.012, which reads, "[t]he early voting clerk shall mail without charge an appropriate official application form for an early voting ballot to each applicant requesting the clerk to send the applicant an application form." *Id.* § 84.012. In the State's view, section 84.012 prohibits the clerk from sending an application for mail ballot unless and until the voter has requested one.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Voting by mail is a multi-step process. First, a registered voter must submit to the early voting clerk an application indicating the basis on which the voter is qualified to vote by mail. TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 84.001, 84.007-.009. The early voting clerk must then process the application and mail a ballot to the voter. *Id.* at § 86.001. Finally, the voter must return the marked ballot to the early voting clerk within the statutorily prescribed deadlines. *Id.* at §86.006, 86.007. Importantly, Mr. Hollins plans to send only applications, not ballots, to all registered voters.

Having considered the evidence and arguments presented by the Parties, the Court finds that Mr. Hollins's contemplated action is not *ultra vires* and does not impede the free exercise of voting rights. No writ shall issue.

## Analysis

#### 1. Ultra Vires Claim

A government official acts *ultra vires* if the official "acted without legal authority or failed to perform a ministerial act." *City of El Paso v. Heinrich*, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). Here, the Court must determine whether the statutory provisions of the Texas Election Code permit the conduct contemplated by Mr. Hollins. The Court's primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. *City of Rockwall v. Hughes*, 246 S.W.3d. 621, 625 (Tex. 2008). To do so, the Court reads the statute as a whole, not individual provisions in isolation. *Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske*, 438 S.W.3d 39, 51 (Tex. 2014).

As County Clerk, Mr. Hollins serves as the "early voting clerk" for the November 2020 election in Harris County. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 83.002. The early voting clerk has "the same duties and authority with respect to early voting as a presiding election judge has with respect to regular voting . . .." *Id.* at § 83.001(c). Thus, as it relates to early voting, Mr. Hollins "is in charge of and responsible for the management and conduct of the election . . .." *Id.* at § 32.071. In Texas, early voting is conducted in person and by mail. *Id.* at § 81.001. Accordingly, the Election Code gives Mr. Hollins a broad grant of authority to conduct and manage mail-in voting, subject only to any express limitation on that power by the Legislature. *See Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District v. State*, 575 S.W.3d 339,

352 (Tex. 2019) (finding officials' conduct to be *ultra vires* where the conduct conflicted with statutes circumscribing an otherwise broad grant of authority).

The Legislature has spoken at length on the mechanisms for mail-in voting. There are no fewer than 42 Election Code provisions on the subject. *See* TEX. ELEC. CODE, Chs. 84, 86 & 87. In those provisions, the Legislature has made clear that in order to vote by mail a voter first "must make an application for an early voting ballot." *Id.* at § 84.001. But, as to how the voter is to obtain the application, the Election Code is silent.


There is no code provision that limits an early voting clerk's ability to send a vote by mail application to a registered voter. Section 84.012 contains no prohibitive language whatsoever, but rather, requires the early voting clerk to take affirmative action in the instance a voter does request an application to vote by mail. That the clerk must provide an application upon request does not preclude the clerk from providing an application absent a request.

Indeed, there are a number of code provisions that demonstrate the Legislature's desire for mail voting applications to be freely disseminated. For example, section 1.010 mandates that a county clerk with whom mail voting applications are to be filed (*e.g.*, Mr. Hollins) make the applications "readily and timely available." *Id.* at § 1.010. In addition, section 84.013 requires that vote by mail applications be provided "in reasonable quantities without charge to individuals or organizations requesting them for distribution to voters." *Id.* at § 84.013. Further, the Court notes that, consistent with these provisions, both the Secretary of State and the County make the application for a mail ballot readily available on their respective websites.

Against the backdrop of this statutory scheme, the Court cannot accept the State's interpretation of section 84.012. To do so would read into the statute words that do not exist and would lead to the absurd result that any and every private individual or organization may without limit send unsolicited mail voting applications to registered voters, but that the early voting clerk, who possesses broad statutory authority to manage and conduct the election, cannot. Mr. Hollins's contemplated conduct does not exceed his statutory authority as early voting clerk and therefore is not *ultra vires*.

#### 2. Section 31.005 Claim

With respect to the State's invocation of section 31.005 — a statute intended to *protect* Texans' exercise of the right to vote — as a basis to restrain Mr. Hollins, the Court is confounded. It appears the State contends that Mr. Hollins's actions "may impede[] the free exercise of a citizen's voting rights," *id.* at § 31.005, by fostering confusion over voter eligibility to vote by mail. That contention rings hollow, however. The State offered no evidence to support such a claim, and the document Mr. Hollins intends to send to voters, as set forth below, accurately and thoroughly informs them of Texas law concerning mail-in voting.



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The Texas Supreme Court has instructed that the decision to apply for a ballot to vote by mail is within the purview of the voter. *In re State of Texas*, 602 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2020). This Court firmly believes that Harris County voters are capable of reviewing and understanding the document Mr. Hollins proposes to send and exercising their voting rights in compliance with Texas law.

Finally, the irony and inconsistency of the State's position in this case is not lost on the Court. The State has stipulated that it has no objection to unsolicited mail ballot applications being sent to voters age 65 or over. But being 65 or older is only one of four statutorily permitted bases for voting by mail in Texas, the others being disability,<sup>2</sup> absence and incarceration. TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 82.001-.004. The State offers no evidence or compelling explanation for its arbitrary and selective objection to the mailing of vote by mail applications to registered voters under the age of 65.

The Court DENIES the State of Texas's application for temporary injunction.

Signed on September 11, 2020.

R.K. Sandill Judge, 127<sup>th</sup> District Court Harris County, Texas

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  The Parties dedicated a great deal of briefing and argument to the issue of whether and to what degree Texas voters may qualify to vote by mail under the disability category during the COVID-19 pandemic. This issue, however, is not before this Court, having been decided by the Texas Supreme Court in *In Re State of Texas*, 602 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2020).